Weaxor Ransomware Decryption & Data Recovery

Immediately remove public mappings of port 1433 (and 3306, 1521, 3389), cut external access and internal SMB reachability for affected servers, and disable sa and any other compromised privileged accounts. If the database service was killed, do not repeatedly try to start it — repeated attempts can further damage file structures.

Because Weaxor uses multi-layer obfuscated loading, process injection and AMSI bypass, residual payloads are hard to spot, so forensics must be thorough: SQL Server error logs and logon auditing, records of xp_cmdshell being enabled, child processes of sqlservr.exe, web middleware access logs where the entry point was a web flaw, PowerShell and batch scripts written to disk, scheduled task and service inventories, memory images from still-running hosts, the original RECOVERY INFO.txt notes, encrypted samples of varying type and size, and matching unencrypted originals.

Preserve a complete file listing and timestamps for the database directories as well. Do not reinstall, do not reformat, and do not attempt repairs on original disks.

Family determination: Weaxor is identified by the RECOVERY INFO.txt note together with .rox, .weax or .wxx extensions, and must be separated clearly from Mallox (FILE RECOVERY.txt and similar, with .mallox or .bitenc). This distinction decides whether the Avast decryptor could apply — it does not for Weaxor, and settling it immediately saves time otherwise spent hunting for tools.

Entry point: Weaxor has two main routes and it is essential to establish which, or the environment will be breached again after recovery.

• Database route: reconstruct the brute-force timeline from SQL Server error logs and confirm which account succeeded and how commands were executed.
• Web vulnerability route: reconstruct the exploit requests from middleware logs, identify the component and version abused, and enumerate every web shell and persistence mechanism.

Encryption analysis: sample database files, large archives and ordinary documents to determine whether encryption is partial or full, the block stride, and where damaged structures sit. This decides whether Step 3 can offer database repair. Residual components left by process injection and AMSI bypass are audited at the same time.

State plainly that no public decryptor exists and that Avast's Mallox tool does not apply, then prioritise around the databases:

• Backup path: verify the recovery point and integrity of standalone backup machines, offline media, NAS snapshots, cloud version history, hypervisor snapshots, log shipping and Always On secondaries.
• Repair path: sample .mdf/.ldf, .dbf and .ibd files to map page- and block-level damage; give table-level coverage estimates where encryption is partial and state honestly where it is full.
• Replay path: determine the time range that transaction logs, archive logs, upstream systems and paper documents can reconstruct.
• Side-channel data: downstream warehouses, report exports, read-only replicas, ETL staging tables and reconciliation data.
• Confirmed unrecoverable: listed explicitly so the business can plan re-entry.

The plan specifies the delivery sequence — usually core operational databases and live transaction tables first, historical data afterwards — plus per-batch verification and expected timing.

Execution happens in a clean environment where the vulnerability is patched and web shells and residual payloads have been removed, working throughout on read-only images and copies.

• Database repair: where encryption is confirmed partial, map page-level damage in SQL Server, repair system tables and allocation structures and extract table by table; for Oracle, combine datafile header repair with archive-log application; for MySQL, process .ibd files individually and rebuild the dictionary.
• Delta reconstruction: replay unaffected transaction logs, archive logs, upstream transaction feeds and documents to push the recovery point as close to the encryption moment as possible.
• Backup restoration: validate backup integrity and screen for embedded payloads in isolation first, then restore in priority order.
• Files and shares: restore in batches by department priority.
• Side-channel reload: import reconstructed reports and reconciliation data back into the system by business period.

Each batch is reconciled: table-level record counts against the business system, sampled key documents verified, and application connectivity and functionality tested. The recovery environment stays isolated from production until residual payloads and backdoors are ruled out.

The investigation report states: the initial entry point (database brute force or web exploitation), the timeline, which account succeeded or which component version was abused, the command-execution mechanism, the payload delivery chain, residues left by process injection and AMSI bypass, lateral scope, why backups failed, and whether data was exfiltrated.

Verifiable hardening checklist:

• Keep database ports off the internet: remove public mappings of 1433/3306/1521 and route remote access through VPN with enforced multi-factor authentication.
• Set strong passwords with source-IP restrictions on sa, root and other privileged accounts, disable dangerous extensions such as xp_cmdshell, and run the database service under a low-privilege account.
• Web asset management: inventory every internet-facing web service and middleware version and establish an emergency patch process for critical vulnerabilities — Weaxor follows new disclosures with mass deployment.
• Segment database hosts from the general business network and separate databases from application servers.
• Move backups to offline/off-site plus immutable storage, physically separate database backups from data files, and run regular real restore drills.
• Deploy EDR across database and web servers with a closed alert loop for failed logons, xp_cmdshell being enabled, application processes spawning children, and anomalous PowerShell.

The engagement closes with an incident report and a hardening sign-off checklist.