Ransomware family
Phobos Ransomware Decryption & Data Recovery
- Active
- High
- Free decryptor available
Phobos is a RaaS family that relies mainly on brute-forced RDP and has spawned a long list of variants (.eking, .faust, .elbie, .devos and more). It has been a persistent presence in Chinese server-ransomware cases, and in July 2025 Japan's National Police Agency released a free decryptor covering part of the lineage.
- First seen
- 2018-12
- File extensions
- .phobos .eking .faust
- Ransom notes
- info.txt
- Affected platforms
- Windows / Databases
Family profile
- File extensions
- .phobos
- .eking
- .faust
- .elbie
- .eight
- .devos
- .backmydata
- .LIZARD
- .2700
- .help
- Ransom notes
- info.txt
- info.hta
- Contact patterns
- Disposable mailboxes (onionmail.org, cock.li, tutanota, cyberfear.com, airmail.cc)
- Backup mailbox (two addresses in the same note)
- ICQ / Jabber in early builds, Telegram as the fallback channel more recently
- Aliases / versions
- Eking、Faust、Elbie、Eight、Devos、Backmydata、Elking、LIZARD、2700
- First seen
- 2018-12
- Status
- Active
- Threat level
- High
- Affected platforms
- Windows
- Databases
- Tags
- Prevalent in China
- Ransomware-as-a-Service
- RDP brute force
- Targets databases
- Active
In July 2025 Japan's National Police Agency, with support from Europol's European Cybercrime Centre and the FBI, released a free decryptor for Phobos and 8Base, available from the NPA site and from No More Ransom. Official guidance lists coverage for .phobos, .8base, .elbie, .faust, .LIZARD and related variant extensions.
Preconditions and limits:
- Active malware must be fully removed from the host first, or files will simply be re-encrypted.
- The tool targets the Phobos lineage but does not decrypt every variant and every build; always test on a small set of copies and confirm the output is usable before processing in bulk.
- Run it against read-only images or copies, never directly against original disks.
- Families often loosely labelled "Phobos-like" in China, such as Makop and BeijingCrypt, are not covered — accurate family identification comes first.
Latest activity
Phobos administrator Evgenii Ptitsyn pleaded guilty to wire fraud conspiracy in the US. Court filings put the operation at over $39M from 1,000+ entities (Nov 2020-Apr 2024); affiliates paid ~$300 per decryption key.
SourcesPoland's CBZC arrested a 47-year-old Phobos-linked suspect in Malopolska under Europol's Operation Aether; seized devices held stolen credentials and server IPs. Arrests continue; exposed RDP remains the main risk.
Sources
Overview
Phobos emerged in late 2018, closely resembling Crysis/Dharma in ransom-note style and operating model, and was then rented to affiliates as a service. That produced a long list of same-lineage variants: Eking, Faust, Elbie, Eight, Devos, Backmydata, 8Base and others. CISA issued a dedicated #StopRansomware advisory (AA24-060A) in February 2024, identifying Phobos as a sustained threat to government bodies and smaller enterprises; at the operator's March 2026 guilty plea, US court filings put the lineage's ransom takings at more than USD 39 million from over 1,000 entities.
China context: Phobos generates one of the highest volumes of decryption requests in China. Across several 2025 landscape reports, 360 identified it as the family with the largest number of decrypted files, and its infection volume stays near the top. The reason is straightforward: it targets small and mid-sized business servers exposing port 3389 with weak credentials, and such assets are extremely common domestically. Since the July 2025 decryptor release it has become one of the few high-prevalence families with a genuine official decryption path, though attacks continue.
How to identify it
The filename pattern is the most reliable Phobos indicator: originalname.originalext.id[8-char volume serial-4 digits].[attacker email].variant extension — for example report.xlsx.id[A1B2C3D4-3483].[xxx@onionmail.org].faust. Older builds used an uppercase ID with 8 characters; newer builds use lowercase "id" and append 4 fixed digits.
Common variant extensions: .phobos, .eking, .faust, .elbie, .eight, .devos, .backmydata, .LIZARD, .2700, .help. Extensions rotate frequently, so an unfamiliar suffix on a filename matching the pattern above is almost certainly Phobos lineage.
Ransom notes: info.txt and info.hta are dropped together, and info.hta pops up automatically once encryption completes, listing two anonymous mailboxes and asking the victim to quote their ID.
Other signs: database and backup services forcibly terminated; volume shadow copies deleted; firewall rules modified to keep RDP reachable; and several servers in the same segment encrypted within a short window, indicating hands-on lateral movement.
Infection vectors
Brute-forced RDP dominates. The CISA advisory and vendor analyses describe the same affiliate workflow: scan the internet for open port 3389, run open-source brute-force tooling against common usernames and passwords, then reuse the credential or escalate locally and move sideways. In Chinese cases the script is almost invariable — a server with 3389 mapped straight to the internet and a weak administrator password.
Other entry points include phishing loaders followed by hands-on operation, leaked or reused VPN and remote-management credentials, database port brute-forcing on MS SQL or MySQL followed by command execution through stored procedures, and shared unaudited accounts on outsourced maintenance channels.
Inside the network, operators dump credentials, distribute the payload via SMB shares and scheduled tasks, and hunt for backup directories and mapped NAS drives. Lateral movement is less sophisticated than LockBit's, but because victim networks are flat and unsegmented the blast radius still covers the whole business network.
Encryption behavior
Phobos encrypts file contents with AES-256 and protects the symmetric key with RSA-1024, generating key material per host.
Size-based partial encryption is a technically important trait: the CISA advisory states that files below 1.5 MB are fully encrypted while files above that threshold are only partially encrypted, to improve speed. This matters for recovery — SQL Server .mdf files, Oracle .dbf files, large archives and virtual disks all sit far above 1.5 MB and usually retain a meaningful proportion of intact blocks.
Destructive and evasive behaviour: deletes volume shadow copies and disables Windows recovery and automatic repair; terminates database, mail and backup-agent services to release file locks before encrypting; modifies firewall rules to keep the attacker's remote access open; encrypts local disks, mapped network drives and reachable SMB shares, which is why NAS devices and file servers are commonly hit; then writes info.txt and info.hta and displays the pop-up note. Phobos targets Windows, with no mature native Linux or ESXi payload observed.
Assess before you act
Recoverability assessment
Phobos has one of the better recovery outlooks among high-prevalence families in China. Work it in this order.
1. The official free decryptor (first choice, always attempt) The Phobos/8Base decryptor released by Japan's NPA in July 2025 is available from No More Ransom and covers .phobos, .8base, .elbie, .faust, .LIZARD and related variants. Remove any running malware first, then trial-decrypt a small batch of read-only copies and confirm the output opens correctly before bulk processing. Coverage does not extend to every variant and build, so suffixes such as .eking or .devos must be verified empirically.
2. Backups, snapshots and shadow copies Phobos deletes shadow copies but usually damages backup infrastructure less thoroughly than an organised RaaS. Check standalone backup machines not joined to the domain, offline removable media, NAS-native snapshots, cloud and object-storage version history, and historical .bak output from scheduled database backups.
3. Structure-level repair of large files Because files above 1.5 MB are only partially encrypted, SQL Server .mdf/.ldf, Oracle .dbf files and virtual disks often retain substantial intact regions. Depending on how encryption was applied, structural repair and table-level extraction can be attempted, with transaction logs and business documents replayed to close the delta; coverage is assessed per database and per table.
4. Unencrypted copies and fragment recovery Unmapped shares, offline endpoints, downstream reporting databases, read-only replicas and exports attached to email frequently survive. Where new files replaced originals, unoverwritten sectors may also be recoverable if writes stop early.
We do not pay ransoms, do not negotiate for clients, and never promise that every file can be decrypted. The first step is always accurate family and variant identification.
Our response plan
Hit by Phobos ransomware? What to do
Step 1: Containment and evidence preservation
Immediately remove public exposure of affected servers, close inbound 3389, and disable all suspicious and newly created local accounts (Phobos operators commonly leave one or two self-created administrator accounts). Temporarily block SMB between affected hosts and the rest of the internal network to prevent a second wave.
Evidence to preserve: successful and failed RDP authentication logs (to establish the brute-force entry point and timeline), security and system event logs, firewall rule change records, scheduled task and service inventories, the original info.txt and info.hta notes, a set of encrypted samples, and matching unencrypted originals where they can be found. Do not reinstall, do not reformat, and do not write new data to original disks.
Step 2: Family identification and variant determination
The Phobos lineage has many variants, and whether the official decryptor applies depends entirely on getting the variant and build right, so this step cannot be skipped.
Evidence used: whether filenames match the .id[8 chars-4 digits].[email].suffix pattern, whether the notes are the info.txt plus info.hta pair, the mailbox domains, marker structures in encrypted file headers and footers, and the compilation and configuration characteristics of the payload sample. Phobos must also be clearly separated from Makop, BeijingCrypt and Crysis/Dharma, which are frequently conflated with it in China — the notes look similar but the decryption tooling is completely different.
Once identified, take encrypted samples of different types and sizes and trial-decrypt them with the NPA tool to establish feasibility before designing the plan.
Step 3: Recoverability assessment and recovery planning
Assets are bucketed into decryptable, restorable from backup, repairable, fragment-recovery only, and confirmed unrecoverable, each with a time and coverage estimate:
- Portions where the official decryptor succeeded in testing: define the scope and runtime for bulk execution.
- Variants where trial decryption failed: route to backup and structural repair.
- Databases and virtual disks above 1.5 MB: sample-based repair feasibility with table-level coverage estimates.
- Files below 1.5 MB that were fully encrypted: where the decryptor does not apply, these depend mainly on backups, side-channel copies and fragment recovery.
The plan states explicitly which data is confirmed unrecoverable, so the business can arrange re-entry or external communication in advance.
Step 4: Recovery execution
All work happens on read-only images or copies. Sequence the high-certainty, high-value items first:
- Official decryption: after malware removal, run in batches and validate openability and integrity after each batch.
- Database repair: structural repair and table-level extraction for SQL Server .mdf/.ldf, Oracle .dbf and MySQL tablespaces, with transaction and archive log replay. Given the "partial encryption above 1.5 MB" behaviour, locate the damaged pages first and map which tables they affect.
- File servers and NAS: business-critical directories first, delivered in batches by department.
- Endpoints: fragment recovery plus consolidation of side-channel copies.
Each batch ships with verification records: record-count reconciliation, sampled document checks and application-level availability tests. The recovery environment stays isolated from production until residual backdoors are ruled out.
Step 5: Attribution, hardening and sign-off
Reconstruct the chain: source IPs and timeline of the brute-force attempts, which account succeeded, attacker-created accounts and backdoors, which hosts were reached laterally, and why backups failed. Conclusions in Phobos cases are usually blunt — a server with 3389 exposed and a weak password — and that conclusion must appear in the report mapped to remediation items.
Verifiable hardening list: remove all public 3389 exposure and route remote access through VPN with enforced multi-factor authentication; tighten administrator password policy and clean up accounts; segment servers to limit internal SMB and RDP reachability; move backups to offline/off-site plus immutable storage with regular restore drills; take database ports off the internet and eliminate weak sa/root credentials; deploy EDR with a closed alert loop for brute-force and anomalous logons. The engagement closes with an incident report and sign-off checklist.
Risk warning
What not to do
- Do not run the decryptor against original disks. Take read-only images first, trial-decrypt on copies, validate the output, and only then process in bulk.
- Do not decrypt on a host where the malware has not been removed — Phobos frequently leaves self-created administrator accounts and persistence, and immediate re-encryption is common.
- Do not assume decryptability from lineage alone. Whether variants such as .eking or .devos are covered by the official tool must be verified empirically.
- Do not delete info.txt, info.hta or encrypted samples — they are required inputs for variant identification and decryption feasibility testing.
- Do not reinstall the OS or reformat affected volumes, and do not rebuild partitions to "clean up" — that destroys the fragment-recovery option as well.
- Do not email the addresses in the note to pay on your own. Payment guarantees neither a working decryptor nor protection from a second extortion attempt.
Emergency response
Data already encrypted? Stop and let an engineer look first
We do not pay ransoms and we do not negotiate with attackers. Engineers run a free assessment first, then propose a recovery plan and a firm quote.
Related scenarios
File Servers and NAS Encrypted by Ransomware
When shared folders on a file server or NAS are encrypted, drawings, contracts, archives, quotations and design sources all become unusable at once — and mapped drives spread the impact to every endpoint. This page covers how to gauge spread, what shadow copies and snapshots realistically offer, and how to sequence recovery by business value.
Database Encrypted by Ransomware
When database files are encrypted, every business system that depends on them stops at once. This page explains how we triage an encrypted database, how recoverability is assessed, and when file repair, backup-plus-log restore, or rebuild is the right path.
SQL Server Database Encrypted by Ransomware
When SQL Server .mdf / .ldf files are encrypted, the ERP and inventory systems built on them — Yonyou U8, Kingdee K/3, Guanjiapo, Suda — stop completely. This page covers evidence handling, how we judge whether page-level repair is viable, and the conditions for backup-plus-log restore.
Backups Deleted or Destroyed
Modern ransomware follows a fixed sequence: destroy the backups, then encrypt the data — deleting shadow copies, encrypting repositories, disabling jobs, and exploiting backup software flaws to steal credentials. This page covers what can still be inventoried once backups fail, why replication propagates encrypted files off-site, and what offline and immutable copies are really worth.
Related industries
Manufacturing Ransomware Response and Recovery
Ransomware in manufacturing hits information systems and production cadence at the same time: with ERP down there are no orders, with MES down there is no schedule, and an encrypted drawing library takes the process documentation for an entire product line with it. This page covers the asset profile, recovery priorities and targeted defences.
Healthcare Ransomware Response and Recovery
When a hospital is hit, registration, consultation, orders, billing, laboratory and imaging fail at the same moment and care falls back to paper. This page covers the healthcare threat picture, a recovery priority built around clinical continuity, and the handling of patient data and compliance obligations.
Education and Research Ransomware Response
Schools and research institutions run open networks with dispersed endpoints and systems built across many eras, often unattended at night and during holidays — a combination attackers exploit. This page covers the sector's threat profile, recovery priorities for academic and research data, and defences suited to campus networks.
Similar families
- Some versions decryptable
Crysis / Dharma
Crysis (CrySiS) and its successor Dharma have been active since 2016, breaking in through brute-forced RDP and spawning many variants including .cezar, .arena, .bip, .combo and .java. Early versions have free decryptors; the .cezar family from 2017 onward does not.
- Free decryptor available
8Base
8Base was a Phobos-based double-extortion crew marked by the .8base extension, info.txt / info.hta notes and an ID-plus-email filename pattern, focused on small and mid-size firms. Its infrastructure was seized in February 2025 and Japan's NPA released a free decryptor in July 2025.
- No public decryptor
Makop
Makop has operated as a RaaS since 2020, with affiliates breaking in mainly through brute-forced remote desktop credentials and deploying by hand. Extensions include .makop, .mkp and .baseus, with a readme-warning.txt note. It ranks consistently high in Chinese infection statistics and has no public decryptor.
Related questions
- First response
What should I do if I've been hit by ransomware?
Isolate first and keep the power on: unplug the network cable or turn off Wi-Fi, but do not reboot, format, delete the ransom note or contact the attackers. Then work in order: confirm it is ransomware and whether it is still spreading, preserve the note, encrypted samples and logs, identify the family, inventory backups and snapshots to assess recovery paths, and report the incident. Do not reconnect restored systems until the entry point is closed, credentials are rotated and backdoors are removed.
- Recovery
Can files encrypted by ransomware be recovered?
Often in part, sometimes almost entirely, but nobody can promise it before seeing samples. Recoverability comes down to four things: the family and version (is there a public decryptor, seized keys or a known flaw), how the files were encrypted (in full, or only partly), which backups, snapshots and other copies survived, and what has been written to the disks since. Where a modern family encrypted files correctly and completely, no copies survive and the remnants have been overwritten, the data may genuinely be gone. Stop all writes and identify the family first.
- First response
What should we do when a server is hit by ransomware?
Isolate first and do not reboot: cut the affected server off at the switch or in the cloud security group, but leave it running. Then snapshot or image the system and data disks, keep the ransom note and encrypted samples, and check read-only whether shadow copies, cloud snapshots and backups survived. If several servers are down, set a restore order by business dependency, and bring nothing back online until the entry point is closed and every credential has been changed. What can be recovered depends on the family, the encryption mode and the backups.
- Recovery
Which ransomware decryption tools exist, and are downloaded ones safe to use?
Yes, but not many. Legitimate free decryptors come from the No More Ransom project, law enforcement agencies and the official channels of vendors such as Emsisoft, Avast, Kaspersky, Bitdefender and 360, and each usually works only for specific versions of a specific family. Programs circulating online as universal or dedicated decryptors are often malware or paid scams. Even with a genuine tool, confirm the family and version match first, and run it only on copies of your files.
- First response
My files all have a new extension and won't open - what should I do?
Do not rename or repair anything yet. If files of many types share the same unfamiliar appended extension (often with an ID and an email address), text, HTA or HTML notes have appeared in every folder and the wallpaper has changed, it is almost certainly ransomware. If only one file type fails, USB files turned into shortcuts, or names are garbled but content opens, a file association, USB worm or encoding problem is more likely. Until you know, disconnect the network, keep the machine on, and save a sample plus the note for identification.
FAQ
Phobos Frequently asked questions
Can .faust / .elbie / .eking files be decrypted for free?
There is an official path, but with distinctions. The free Phobos/8Base decryptor released by Japan's NPA in July 2025 is documented as covering .phobos, .8base, .elbie, .faust, .LIZARD and related variants, and is available from No More Ransom. So .faust and .elbie fall within the explicitly stated scope and are worth trying immediately.
.eking belongs to the Phobos lineage, but the official announcement does not enumerate every variant suffix, so success has to be verified against real samples. The method: trial-decrypt several files of different sizes on read-only copies; only files that open correctly prove the variant and build are covered. If trial decryption fails, move to backups and structure-level repair.
Filenames became .id[XXXXXXXX-XXXX].[email].suffix — which family is this?
That pattern is the clearest Phobos signature. The 8 characters come from the victim host's volume serial number, the following 4 are fixed digits, the bracketed address is the attacker's contact mailbox, and the trailing suffix is the variant name. Combined with the info.txt and info.hta note pair, it is effectively confirmation of Phobos.
Two cautions: Crysis/Dharma filenames also contain an ID and an email, but are usually .id-8 hex chars.[email].suffix with info.hta plus FILES ENCRYPTED.txt as notes; Makop uses .[8-char ID].[email].mkp with readme-warning.txt. Free-decryption prospects differ completely across the three families, and a misidentification means certain failure, so hand the notes and samples to a response team for a definitive call.
Phobos encrypted our SQL Server database — can the .mdf file be repaired?
There is room to assess. The CISA advisory states that Phobos only partially encrypts files above 1.5 MB, and production .mdf files are almost always far larger, so they typically retain many intact data pages. Depending on how encryption was applied, structural repair plus table-level extraction may be possible, with transaction logs (if the .ldf is not fully destroyed) and business-side documents replayed to close the delta.
To be clear: this is repair, not decryption. The output is verifiable partial data, and coverage depends on which tables the damaged pages belong to and whether system tables and allocation pages were hit. The correct process is to image .mdf/.ldf read-only, sample the page-level damage distribution, produce table-level coverage estimates and then execute. Where the official decryptor applies, take that path first.
We used the official decryptor but the files still will not open — why?
Four causes are common. First, the variant or build is outside the tool's coverage — it "completes" but the output is not valid plaintext. Second, malware is still running on the host and the decrypted files are immediately re-encrypted. Third, the decryptor was run directly on original disks and a mid-run failure truncated or partially overwrote files. Fourth, the files suffered damage beyond encryption, such as structural inconsistency caused by a database process being killed.
The correct approach: isolate and clean first, take read-only images, trial-decrypt batches of samples covering different file types and sizes, and validate openability after each batch. If the variant is confirmed to be uncovered, switch promptly to backup restoration and structure-level repair rather than burning the recovery window retrying the same tool.
Phobos almost always enters via RDP brute force — what is the most effective defence?
Ranked by return on effort, the single most effective measure is eliminating all public exposure of port 3389. Route remote administration through a VPN or zero-trust gateway with enforced multi-factor authentication; that alone removes the overwhelming majority of Phobos entry points.
Next: rename built-in accounts such as administrator and give them strong passwords, remove dormant and leftover contractor accounts, and enable lockout policies; segment servers to limit internal RDP and SMB reachability; keep database ports (1433, 3306 and similar) off the internet and eliminate weak credentials; ensure backups include an offline or immutable copy with regular real restore drills; and deploy EDR with a closed alert loop on failed logons so brute-forcing is detected before it succeeds.
Sources
- CISA #StopRansomware: Phobos Ransomware (AA24-060A)
- The Record: Japanese police release decryptor for Phobos ransomware
- No More Ransom: Decryption Tools(Phobos / 8base Decryptor)
- Cisco Talos: A deep dive into Phobos ransomware
- AhnLab ASEC: Warning Against Phobos Ransomware Distributed via Vulnerable RDP
External links are provided for reference only. The content is published by third parties and does not represent our position.
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